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Kuh: Using Local Knowledge to Shrink the Individual Carbon Footprint

USING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE TO SHRINK THE
INDIVIDUAL CARBON FOOTPRINT
KatrinaFischerKuh*
Mayors are on the front lines of impacting human behavior-from
their work on recycling, to aids [sic] prevention, and prostate cancer,
they are changing human behavior every day.I
Local government leaders are ...uniquely positioned to influence

citizen behaviors-their transportation options,
energy consumption
2
patterns and general consumer decisions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Entire texts have been devoted to exploring the meaning of the term
"lifestyle" and sociological understandings of lifestyle are complex and
nuanced. For present purposes, however, a more simple articulation of
the term will suffice. Lifestyle can mean "mode of living, ' 4 including
"patterns of action ' 5 and "patterns of ways of living."6 Without
rendering judgment, one observation that can fairly be made about the
current lifestyles and associated behaviors of Americans is that they
indirectly and directly lead to the emission of a high volume of

* Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law.
1. The United States Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Center, Mayors Leading the
Way on Climate Protection, http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/revised/ (last visited Oct.
26, 2009).
2. ICLEI
Local
Governments
for Sustainability
USA,
Climate
Change,
http://www.icleiusa.org/programs/climate (last visited Oct. 27, 2009) [hereinafter ICLEI Local
Governments].
3. E.g., DAVID CHANEY, LIFESTYLES 4 (1996) ("The term [lifestyle] is used a great deal but
there are problems in defining something as nebulous as a lifestyle.").
4. MICHAEL E. SOBEL, LIFESTYLE AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE: CONCEPTS, DEFINITIONS,
ANALYSES 3 (1981).
5. CHANEY, supra note 3, at 11.

6. Id.at12.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:923

greenhouse gases ("GHGs"). v Although an American diplomat is said to
have remarked in preparing for the Rio Earth Summit that "'the
American lifestyle is not up for negotiation,' 8 a growing number of
legal scholars recognize the need for environmental policy to capture
individual GHG emissions, and have begun to explore whether and how
the law can or should be used to change individual, GHG-emitting
lifestyles and behaviors. 9 One consideration in designing a policy aimed
at individual, GHG-emitting behaviors will be the division of authority
between different levels of government. As evidenced by the opening
quotations, local governments are often characterized as well-situated to
influence individual behavior, particularly GHG-emitting behaviors.' 1
This Idea links concepts developed in the environmental federalism
literature with work discussing the use of law to influence environmental
7. The per capita carbon dioxide emissions of the average American is estimated to be
approximately twenty metric tons per year. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, WORLD
PER CAPITA CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS FROM THE CONSUMPTION AND FLARING OF FOSSIL FUELS
1980-2006, at I tbl.H.1cco2 (2008), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/intemational/
iealf/tablehlcco2.xls. Even limited to emissions from "behaviors over which individuals have
direct, substantial control, the total emissions for the average American in 2000 equaled over 14,000
pounds (seven tons) of carbon dioxide." Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The
Carbon-NeutralIndividual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1693 (2007).
8. James Salzman, Sustainable Consumption and the Law, 27 ENVTL. L. 1243, 1256 (1997)
(quoting Joe Kirwin, Less than $5 Billion Pledgedfor Agenda 21 Action Plan; Final Document to
Be Released by United Nations in September, 15 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 486 (July 15,
1992)).
9. See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving the
Environment: Moving Toward a New EnvironmentalNorm, 33 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 117, 123,
145-49 (2009) [hereinafter Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility] (analyzing the role of
norms in shaping environmental behavior); Hope M. Babcock, Global Climate Change: A Civic
Republican Moment for Achieving Broader Changes in EnvironmentalBehavior, 26 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 1, 5-6, 13 (2009) [hereinafter Babcock, Global Climate Change] (arguing for a new norm of
environmental responsibility and identifying climate change as an opportunity for developing this
norm); John C. Dernbach, HarnessingIndividual Behavior to Address Climate Change: Optionsfor
Congress, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 107, 114, 121, 129-30 (2008) (identifying how Congress can better
engage individuals in the effort to reduce GHG emissions); Holly Doremus & W. Michael
Hanemann, OfBabies and Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act's Cooperative FederalismFramework
Is Useful for Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799, 814-16 (2008) (identifying the
capacity to generate individual behavior change as an important criterion for assessing proposed
climate change policy); Andrew Green, Self Control, Individual Choice, and Climate Change, 26
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 77, 91 (2008) (discussing constraints on individual action to reduce GHG
emissions, including self-interest, bounded rationality, and bounded willpower); Albert C. Lin,
Evangelizing Climate Change, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1135, 1146-53 (2009) (exploring appeals to
values as a mechanism for encouraging climate-friendly behavior); Michael P. Vandenbergh et al.,
Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1720 (2008)
(identifying seven readily implemented actions that can reduce individual emissions); Vandenbergh
& Steinemann, supra note 7, at 1712-14, 1726-27 (advocating for the development of a carbon
neutrality norm to spur individual behavior change).
10. ICLEI Local Govemments, supra note 2.
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behaviors"1 to consider the competence of local governments with
respect to influencing individual, GHG-emitting lifestyle and behavior
choices.
Many local governments have been surprisingly active in adopting
climate change mitigation measures. Local mitigation efforts include
everything from self-imposed GHG emissions reduction targets and
renewable portfolio standards, to "green" building codes. 12 This local
action is surprising because local efforts to mitigate climate change defy
a bedrock principle of environmental federalism-namely, that
jurisdictions cannot be relied upon to curtail environmental harms where
they do not internalize the costs and benefits of doing so. 1 3 (Notably, in
the context of climate change, localities that undertake climate change
mitigation efforts internalize all of the costs of such measures yet share
the benefits (reduced emissions
and potentially lessened climate change
14
impacts) with the world.)
The unexpected willingness of local governments to engage in
climate change mitigation has occasioned a flurry of reflection and
debate about whether local efforts are meaningful,15 what the
implications of local climate change initiatives are for theories of

11. In particular, the work of Professor Michael P. Vandenbergh. See, e.g., Michael P.
Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated Entity in the New Era of
Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REv. 515, 597-99 (2004) [hereinafter Vandenbergh, From
Smokestack to SUV]; Vandenbergh et al., supra note 9, at 1715-16; Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order
Without Social Norms: How PersonalNorm Activation Can Protect the Environment, 99 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1101, 1103-04 (2005) [hereinafter Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms]; Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Taking Individual Behavior Seriously, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Fall 2005, at 2, 4
[hereinafter Vandenbergh, Taking Individual Behavior Seriously]; Vandenbergh & Steinemann,
supranote 7, at 1688-89, 1696.
12. See generally J. Kevin Healy, Local Initiatives, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S.
LAW 421,422-42 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007).
13. Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of NationalEnvironmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1215-16 (1977) (describing
the Tragedy of the Commons and spillover effects); see also David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel,
Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92
MINN. L. REv. 1796, 1846-47 (2008) (observing that local climate change mitigation efforts are in
"direct contravention" to traditional precepts of environmental federalism).
14. Katherine Trisolini & Jonathan Zasloff, Cities, Land Use, and the Global Commons:
Genesis and the Urban Politics of Climate Change, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE,
NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 72, 80 (William C.G. Bums & Hari M. Osofsky
eds., 2009).
15. For example, Professors Jonathan Zasloff and Katherine A. Trisolini, although not
endorsing this view, recognize the possibility that "cities [may] be engaging in mere window
dressing ... without really taking the difficult steps required to actually reduce their emissions" and
that "municipal rhetoric on climate change remains just that." Id. at 88.
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environmental federalism,1 6 and how the motivations of local actors can
be understood.1 7 Additionally, there has been much discussion about the
efficacy of local actions and the appropriate role for local governments
in addressing the climate change problem.18
This Idea does not consider which level of government is best
suited to address or attempt to define the optimal role of local
governments with respect to climate change (writ large). Instead, this
Idea seeks to assess the competence of local governments in
implementing one particular climate change mitigation strategyeffecting changes in lifestyle and behaviors that reduce individual GHG
emissions. Are local governments uniquely situated to spur lifestyle and
behavioral changes that achieve reductions in their citizens' individual
carbon footprints? The answer to this question appears, at least with
respect to direct changes to lifestyle and behavior, 19 to be yes. Local
governments possess community information helpful for (1) identifying
the types of lifestyle and behavior changes feasible for a particular
community, and (2) implementing programs to generate those changes.
While further study is needed, a preliminary analysis suggests that the
community-specific information possessed by local governments could
enhance policies aimed at changing GHG-emitting lifestyles and
behaviors.
II. INDIVIDUALS

AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION

Before discussing the potential contributions of local governments
with respect to reducing individual carbon footprints, some discussion is
warranted as to why it makes sense to focus on changes in individual
lifestyle and behaviors as a mitigation strategy in the first instance. The
16. E.g., Adelman & Engel, supra note 13, at 1847-49 (using the example of state and local
climate change mitigation as support for a theory of adaptive federalism); Kirsten Engel, State and
Local Climate Change Initiatives: What is Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a
Global Problem and What Does This Say About Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB.
LAW. 1015, 1026-28 (2006) (discussing the implication for theories of environmental federalism of
state and local action to address climate change).
17. E.g., Engel, supranote 16, at 1023-25; Trisolini & Zasloff, supranote 14, at 90.
18. E.g., Laura H. Kosloff et al., Outcome-Oriented Leadership: How State and Local
Climate Change Strategies Can Most Effectively Contribute to Global Warming Mitigation, 14
WIDENER L.J. 173, 204 (2004) (arguing that "we should think of state and local policies and
measures as a key source of policy experimentation and learning, as a source of public and
corporate education, and as a source of pressure and encouragement to national and international
policy development efforts").
19. The term "direct" serves to distinguish between policies that occasion decisions by
individuals to change their behaviors and policies that alter behaviors or related emissions indirectly
by, for example, raising the costs of goods or mandating product efficiency standards.
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mitigation value of seeking GHG-reducing changes in individual
lifestyle and behaviors can be characterized as having three, primary
components: (1) potential emissions reductions (by volume); (2) policy
diversity; and (3) the establishment of beneficial feedback loops.
First and foremost, emissions traceable to individuals constitute a
significant volume of GHG emissions and changing individual lifestyle
and behaviors can help to mitigate climate change by avoiding (at least a
portion) of these emissions.2 ° In a series of articles, Professor Michael P.
Vandenbergh (along with a number of co-authors) has documented the
origin and volume of emissions from the individual and household
sectors, as well as strategies for reducing these emissions. 2 1 This work
"demonstrate[s] that individual and household emissions comprise
roughly 30 to 40 percent of the [carbon dioxide] emissions from the
United States," and that large volumes of these emissions can be avoided
by relatively small changes in individual lifestyle and behavior.2 2 For
example, in the article Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging
Fruit, Professor Vandenbergh and his co-authors estimate that a 10%
reduction in motor vehicle idling could reduce carbon dioxide emissions
by six to nine million tons per year, 3 a 33% reduction in standby power
consumption could reduce carbon dioxide emissions by sixteen to
twenty-two million tons per year, 24 and that if one-third of households
adjusted their thermostat settings by two degrees, 18.1 to 36.3 million
tons of carbon dioxide emissions could be avoided.25
Thus, individuals generate high volumes of GHG emissions and a
significant volume of these emissions can be avoided by lifestyle and
behavior changes.26 This presents a dilemma for environmental law and
policy. Unlike controlling point source emissions from industrial
20. See Dembach, supra note 9, at 118; Lin, supra note 9, at 1149.
21. Vandenbergh et al., supra note 9, at 1750 tbl.2; Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note
7, at 1693 tbl.l, 1700 tbl.3.
22. Vandenbergh et al., supra note 9, at 1703.
23. Id.at 1724.
24. Id. at 1735.
25. Id. at 1745. Additionally, if half of U.S. households decreased their water heater
temperature by twenty degrees, that would reduce carbon dioxide emissions by twenty-eight to
thirty-nine million tons; a 33% increase in the personal motor vehicle fleet that maintains proper tire
pressure could reduce carbon dioxide emissions by twelve million tons; and if 25% of all registered
vehicles changed air filters annually, that could reduce carbon dioxide emissions by nineteen to
twenty-seven million tons. Id. at 1746-49.
26. Because individuals contribute such a significant percentage of U.S. GHG emissions,
reducing individual emissions may in fact be necessary to achieve GHG reductions sufficient to
avoid the most harmful effects of climate change. Id. at 1709 ("Reductions in these types of lowhanging fruit emissions also may be necessary to make the remarkably large emissions reductions
required to achieve the long-term targets.").
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sources, there are no well-established mechanisms for (directly)
changing individual lifestyle and behavior.27 At present, climate policy
appears over-reliant on price signals and technological (product)
advancements to achieve individual emission reductions.28 Proposed
cap-and-trade legislation, for example, anticipates indirectly influencing
individual behaviors and reducing individual GHG emissions by
increasing the cost of energy-intensive activities and goods. 29 This
presumption is, however, dubious for a variety of reasons, most
importantly that research suggests individuals may not understand and
respond to price signals in expected ways. 30 And the rebound effect, the
junker effect, and population growth all suggest that it would be unwise
to rely on increased product efficiency, alone, to reduce emissions.3 1
Accordingly, efforts to directly "green" individual lifestyles and
behaviors-and not rely solely on price signals to spur such changes or
product efficiency mandates to reduce the impacts of existing lifestyle
and behavior choices-offer an additional policy approach to reduce
individual emissions. In light of the fact that individual lifestyle and
behavior have to date been largely unaddressed by domestic
environmental policy, diversifying policy approaches would seem
prudent.3 2
Finally, convincing individuals to make lifestyle or behavior
changes that reduce GHG emissions (as opposed to indirectly causing
changes through price signals or product efficiency standards) could
have notable co-benefits-it may occasion a broad range of emissionsreducing or other environment-friendly behaviors by that individual,
27. Indeed, individual lifestyle and behavior may be "beyond the scope of our environmental
laws." Babcock, Global Climate Change, supra note 9, at 5; see also id. at 5-6, 17 (proposing that
environmental Nongovernmental Organizations ("NGOs") take the lead in changing norms to
support environmental behaviors and observing that enforcement of laws regarding personal
lifestyle choices would face difficult enforcement challenges); Vandenbergh, Order Without Social
Norms, supra note 11, at 1103-04 (describing the difficulties of applying traditional forms of
environmental regulation to individual behavior and exploring the use of law to activate personal
norms as an alternative).
28. See Dernbach, supra note 9, at 111-14 (critiquing proposed federal climate change
legislation for focusing on industrial emitters and failing to adequately address individuals).
29. Vandenbergh et al., supra note 9, at 1703.
30. Id. at 1703-04 (listing a number of the limitations of relying on indirect measures, such as
price signals, to influence behavior); see also Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 9, at 814-16
(explaining why cap-and-trade systems may fail to capture individual emissions).
31. ROBERT R. NORDHAUS & KYLE W. DANISH, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE,
DESIGNING A MANDATORY GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION PROGRAM FOR THE U.S. 39-40 (2003)

(describing the rebound and junker effects).
32. See Dernbach, supra note 9, at 118 (commenting that the "scale and magnitude" of
advisable emissions reductions "indicate the need to engage all available resources").
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and/or make it more likely that the individual will support the adoption
and enforcement of climate mitigation policies.33 One strategy for
changing individual behavior, for example, is to use information to
activate norms.34 The information and the norms it supports can translate
into a variety of environmentally-friendly behaviors as well as support
for environmental policies.35 Additionally, individuals who participate in
environmental projects, such as volunteer stream monitoring, have been
shown to exhibit greater civic engagement with respect to environmental
issues.36 If individuals who make lifestyle and behavior changes
perceive that they are doing so as part of a larger environmental project,
their "participation" may thus spur greater overall engagement with
respect to environmental issues. And sustained public support for both
enactment and enforcement will likely be particularly important in the
context of climate change, where the benefits of mitigation policies will
likely not be obvious in the near term. 37 Succeeding in changing
individual lifestyle and behavior to reduce GHGs thus has the potential
to create feedback loops that encourage additional emissions reductions
as well as generate support for climate change mitigation policy.
III.

LOCAL INFORMATION BEGETS EFFICIENCY

Changing individual lifestyle and behaviors to reduce GHG
emissions can thus have a number of beneficial effects, beyond
immediate emissions reductions. Constructing policy to generate these
changes, however, presents a complex and novel task. One element of
structuring a policy approach will be to decide how to apportion
responsibility among different levels of government. The comparative
competencies of different levels of government with respect to dealing
with environmental harms is a topic that has been well developed in the

33. Id.at 118-19.
34. E.g., Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 7, at 1704-12.
35. Id. at 1711-12 (describing a recent study which "demonstrate[d] that individuals who
believe that global warming requires immediate attention are more likely to reduce their car fuel
usage, increase their public transportation usage, insulate their homes, and reduce their lighting and
appliance use" and observing that "norm activation can influence civic behaviors, such as voting
and joining advocacy groups").
36. Christine Overdevest et al., Volunteer Stream Monitoring and Local Participationin
NaturalResource Issues, II HUM. ECOLOGY REv. 177, 183 (2004) ("Experienced volunteers were
more active than their inexperienced counterparts in resource management-related behaviors, such
as talking with and providing information to neighbors about resource issues, engaging in personal
reading and research about resource issues, and attending public meetings to discuss issues.").
37. Eric Biber, Climate Change, Causation, and Delayed Harm, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 975,
984-85 (2009).
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environmental federalism literature. 38 These works suggest that one
characteristic of an environmental problem that argues in favor of
greater local involvement is when local information and values are
important to achieving an efficient solution. 39 The example frequently
given is that of a contaminated piece of property. In determining the
appropriate remedy for such a site, local information (such as nearby
land uses and potential future uses for the property) may be integral. °
Local, community information may also be important for designing
policies to influence individual lifestyle and behavior changes.
Proponents of flexible, market mechanisms to reduce GHG emissions
frequently opine that market measures achieve efficient reductions by
allowing regulated entities to assess the "costs" of GHG emission
reductions and to achieve reductions through the lowest cost means
(buying credits or directly reducing emissions).41 When it comes to
individual lifestyle and behavior changes, local information is essential
to the first step in an efficiency-maximizing process--determining the
costs of reducing emissions.4 2 The goal is to achieve the most emission

38. Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495,
1544-45 (1999) [hereinafter Esty, Environmental Governance]. See generally Daniel C. Esty,
Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REv. 570 (1996) (analyzing centralized and
decentralized roles of the federal government in environmental regulation and advocating for a
multitier regulatory structure) [hereinafter Esty, EnvironmentalFederalism].
39. Esty, Environmental Federalism, supra note 38, at 610 ("Environmental problems often
have important local dimensions that are more likely to be captured by giving decisionmaking
authority to those close to the issue.").
40. Esty, Environmental Federalism, supra note 38, at 617 ("The 'right' answer to such
[geographically heterogeneous environmental] problems depends on locality-specific factors such as
on what chemicals are in the waste, whether the waste is migrating off-site, the likelihood that
groundwater is affected, the dependence of those in the community on groundwater for drinking, the
relative scarcity of land, the likely future use of the site, the wealth of the community in question,
and other circumstances. In such cases, on-the-ground knowledge is of central importance, and the
diversity of circumstances is salient. Thus state-by-state or even community-by-community
regulation makes sense. Smaller jurisdictions can tailor their regulatory solutions according to the
exact, location-specific parameters of a given hazardous waste problem."); Esty, Environmental
Governance, supra note 38, at 1556 (observing that "on-the-ground information about a particular
site and its likely future use makes local information critical" and recommending "shared
governance" between federal and local entities).
41. NORDHAUS & DANISH, supra note 31, at 11-13.
42. See Esty, EnvironmentalFederalism,supra note 38, at 606-07 ("[E]conomics teaches that
when environmental background conditions, emissions levels, climate, weather, risk preferences,
policy priorities, and income levels diverge, regulations tailored to localized circumstances will
improve social welfare."). Of course, the present discussion presumes a centralized decision about
desirable emissions levels that is then implemented in different ways locally. Thus, the question is
not tailoring policy preferences regarding the appropriate level of risk or harm to local preferences
but instead tailoring policy implementation to local conditions. See id. at 623 ("The implementation
and enforcement of environmental policy is done best on a relatively decentralized basis to ensure
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reductions at the lowest cost in terms of impacts on lifestyle and
behavior.43 But the "cost" for changing lifestyle and behavior is
frequently not monetary, but instead encompasses slippery factors like
habit, convenience, comfort, culture, and satisfaction, that may outweigh
(or be more salient than) monetary costs. 44 And different lifestyle and
behavior changes will have markedly different benefits (in terms of
emission reductions) depending on local circumstance.45
Some examples help to illustrate the relevance of community-level
information to cost/benefit determinations with respect to climate
change-mitigating lifestyle and behavior changes. The suite of lifestyle
and behavior changes likely to find acceptance and achieve significant
emissions reductions may be quite different in a rural farming
community with single family homes miles from stores and services
(where pickup trucks are actually used for hauling and towing) than in a
more urban community characterized by apartment living and served by
public transportation. As a threshold matter, the "business as usual"
individual GHG emissions, and the possibilities for reductions from
those emissions levels, will be quite different between members of these

that the regulating entity is aware of local circumstances and is accessible to the regulated
community.").
43. Vandenbergh et al., supranote 9, at 1715.
44. See id. at 1715-16 (describing non-monetary barriers to behavioral change); see also id. at
1727 (observing, with respect to motor vehicle idling, that although "the value of the driver's
attention... [is] not a monetary cost, it clearly costs the driver to pay attention to turning off the
engine when the vehicle is stationary").
45. In their recent article, Of Babies and Bathwater. Why the Clean Air Act's Cooperative
Federalism Framework Is Useful for Addressing Global Warming, Professors Holly Doremus and
W. Michael Hanemann propose employing state emission inventory and emission reduction plans
(modeled on the Clean Air Act's SIP requirement) to address climate change, and in particular to
capture emissions from individual behaviors, for some of the same reasons. Doremus & Hanemann,
supra note 9, at 826-27.
There is considerable variation in the ways that states contribute to climate
change, as well as in the relative economic costs and social disruption that
would be associated with various emission reduction measures .... [T]he
details of how to reach a given level of GHG emission reduction can be
enormously important to states and localities. Those decisions, therefore,
should be made locally to the extent feasible.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Dembach, supra note 9, at 157 (suggesting that Congress
"requir[e] or allow[] states to adopt individual or public engagement plans ...[that] would allow
states to tailor individual engagement efforts to their own economic, geographic, and demographic
situations"); Thomas D. Peterson et al., Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change
Policy in the United States That Fully Integrates Levels of Government and Economic Sectors, 26
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 227, 265-66 (2008).
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communities. 46 And the same lifestyle and behavior changes will have
different costs and benefits in each community. 47
For example, in the rural community, the cost of foregoing vehicle
travel or large-size vehicles may be prohibitively high while the cost in
the urban community (with access to public transportation and little
actual "need" for SUVs or pickup trucks) is much lower. Educating
individuals about how to alter lawn care (or agricultural) practices to
reduce emissions or sequester carbon may prove feasible and useful in
the rural community, but largely irrelevant in the urban community
(where most individuals' apartments do not have lawns). The
communities may have different levels of cultural attachment to certain
potentially GHG-intensive behaviors, such as driving trucks, eating beef,
ordering restaurant delivery (to be eaten with plastic utensils off of
plastic plates), or buying leather shoes (like cowboy boots). Local
governments are in a unique position to understand community lifestyles
and behaviors and the concomitant costs of changing them. They can use
that information to identify the lifestyle and behavior changes that can
be most easily achieved and prioritize accordingly.
Beyond identifying the lifestyle/behavioral changes best pursued in
a community, local governments also possess community information
48
important to tailoring public campaigns to achieve those changes.

46. Indeed, many carbon calculators estimate individual carbon footprints based on state,
region, urban area, and (soon) zip code. One example is the Berkeley Institute of the Environment
CoolClimate Carbon Footprint Calculator. Berkley Inst. of the Env't, CoolClimate Carbon Footprint
Calculator, http://coolclimate.berkeley.edu/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
47. Business-as-usual behaviors and emissions in a community may form a baseline
"reference point" against which individuals gauge changes designed to reduce emissions. See
Green, supra note 9, at 89 ("[lIt is not the outcome per se that determines the well-being or utility
an individual obtains from a particular activity, but the change from some reference point." (citing
Shane Frederick, et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 351, 370 (2002))).

48. See Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV, supra note 11, at 621 (observing, with
respect to the regulation of individuals, that "[flor some issues, states and localities may be better
positioned to tailor public information campaigus [sic] and other informational regulatory efforts to
local populations"); Vandenbergh, Taking Individual Behavior Seriously, supra note 11, at 4
("[N]ational norm campaigns may fail if they overlook regional differences in beliefs, norms or
even language. For some issues, EPA and other federal agencies may be better situated to provide
information directly to the public as well as to facilitate the activities of state and local governments.
For others, states and localities may be better positioned to tailor public information campaigns and
other informational regulatory efforts to local populations."); see also Victor B. Flatt, Act Locally,
Affect Globally: How ChangingSocial Norms to Influence the PrivateSector Shows a Path to Using
Local Government to ControlEnvironmentalHarms, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 455, 456 (2008)
(advocating local government development of public-private partnerships to protect the
environment and positing that "the nature of local governments' relationship to social norms means
that local governments can in fact be vehicles for the use of such norms as policy tools").
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Research suggests that world view, cultural and psychological factors,
and ideology all shape how individuals understand and respond to
information.49 Similarly, some scholars have concluded that it is not
possible to rely on environmental norms alone to achieve widespread
public participation-alternate norms, with a broader reach (such as the
norm of personal responsibility), may prove more effective at motivating
action by some individuals.5 0 The chief rationale for doubting the
efficacy of local action to address climate change is the "holes"
problem-some local communities may be motivated to take action to
address climate change but others will not be, thereby creating
jurisdictional gaps. 51 In the present context, however, the factors giving
rise to the holes problem may actually cut in favor of local involvement.
Local governments are much more likely to know the prevailing world
view, ideological bent, and norms of their communities and, thus, may
be able to structure information and compliance campaigns to suit those
community attributes.5 2 Notably, in the context of climate change and
energy conservation, there are many ways to package the message. An
appeal to environmental norms may work in some communities, but
might backfire in others, where it would be more successful to appeal to
a norm of personal responsibility. Some communities might be
motivated to act by references to saving the earth; others by an emphasis
on the cost savings of energy conservation or United States energy
independence. 53
In a recent article, examining how local governments can use norms
to create public-private partnerships with the business community,
Professor Victor B. Flatt offered the following particularly apt example

49. See, e.g., Aaron M. McCright, The Social Bases of Climate Change Concern, Knowledge,
and Policy Support in the U.S. General Public, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1017, 1021-27 (2009)
(analyzing the influence of political identification and other cultural factors on climate change
concern, knowledge, and policy support). See generally Dan M. Kahan et al., The Second National

Risk and Culture Study: Making Sense of-and Making Progress In-The American Culture War of
Fact (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 154; George Wash. Univ. Legal Studies, Paper
No. 370; George Wash. Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law, Paper No. 370; Harvard Law Sch. Program on
=
Risk Regulation, Paper No. 08-26), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 1017189 (discussing the
extent to which core values influence individuals' perception of societal risks related to "culture
war" issues).
50. Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 7, at 1712-17.
51. Jamison E. Colburn, Localism 's Ecology: Protecting and Restoring Habitat in the
Suburban Nation, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 945, 960 (2006); Flatt, supra note 48, at 459.
52. See Esty, Environmental Federalism, supra note 38, at 609-10.
53. See Dernbach, supra note 9, at 124-25 (identifying a number of ways to frame appeals for
climate change mitigating action by individuals).
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of how local governments can tailor climate change messages to local
communities:
Seattle and Houston have both become involved with climate
change issues recently, as have many cities in the country; but, their
differing approaches illustrate how locally tailored social norm
creation is more effective than a national approach. In Seattle, the
approach is centered around the idea of doing what is right, and
controlling bad corporate behavior.... The Seattle mayor traded on
the culture of the city by connecting the city's tradition of
environmentalism to climate change....
[T]he Houston mayor has asked city personnel to inventory GHGs
in the city and has supported assisting businesses with reducing
climate change impacts through energy efficiency. He proposed that
the city begin purchasing large amounts of wind power and gave as a
public reason that it was cheaper and more reliable, i.e., better for
business, while secondarily touting its benefits to the environment.
Moreover, as the leader of the city at the center of the worldwide
energy industry, he has directed the city to become a member of the
International Council of Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) and
has met with Mayor Livingstone of London to discuss climate change
initiatives. The Houston mayor took his city's pro-business reputation
and connected it to climate change.
Both mayors are active on the issue, but their actions are shaped
by their community. In Seattle, the mayor appeals to the local norm of
environmentalism, while in Houston,
the mayor appeals to the business
54
advantages of controlling GHGs.
In addition to
local governments
change behaviors,
concomitant ability

choosing the best message for their communities,
may possess advantages in deploying norms to
including their proximity to individuals and
to incorporate "face-to-face communication and

54. Flatt, supra note 48, at 477-78 (citations omitted). Another useful illustration is provided
by Professor Hope M. Babcock, who comments that "Texas has used the autonomy or individual
liberty norm to good effect in its 'Don't Mess with Texas - Real Texans Don't Litter' anti-littering
campaign. The state emphasizes the aspect of litter prevention that involves individual control over
the quality of the environment rather than government control over the individual." Babcock,
Global Climate Change, supra note 9, at 12. Professors Hari M. Osofsky and Janet Koven Levit
also provide an interesting account of the distinct motivations and mechanisms that caused two very
different cities-Tulsa and Portland-to sign the Mayors Climate Protection Agreement. See
generally Hari M. Osofsky & Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks?: Local Climate Change
Coalitions, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 409 (2008).
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feedback" into public campaigns. 55 Research relating to recycling norms
suggests that efforts to inculcate norms may be most effective when they
incorporate both of those elements.56 Another geographic advantage for
local governments may be the proximity of their citizens to one another
and their concomitant ability to "see" one another's behavior.
Community members who witness other community members adopt a
GHG-friendly behavior may be more readily persuaded to adopt the
same behavior.57 The availability and use of informal external sanctions
such as shaming (to the extent advisable) may also be more effective in
smaller communities. 8 And to the extent that "existing norms and the
ability of norms to change depend heavily on the social, economic, and
59
historical context of the community in which these norms developed,
the importance of context suggests at least the possibility that local
governments may hold knowledge helpful for the development of new
community norms.
Local governments may also be particularly well suited to employ
mandates to achieve compliance with desired lifestyle and behavioral
changes. When it comes to individual lifestyle and behavioral changes,
compliance and enforcement are a bugaboo.6 ° With respect to some
55. See Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1290 (2001) (identifying
face-to-face contact as an important element in instilling recycling norms). Local governments may
also be well positioned to identify whether a community behavior is best characterized as "looseknit" (and thereby less susceptible to social sanctions and reliance on social norms) or "close-knit"
(and thereby potentially hospitable to social norm activation). See Vandenbergh, Order Without
Social Norms, supra note 11, at 1105 & n.22 (articulating the difference between loose-knit and
close-knit situations and the impact on norm activation). Notably, local governments may also have
opportunities to use school curricula to assist in norm activation efforts. See Colburn, supra note 51,
at 996 (referencing, with respect to the role of local governments in conservation, "[l]ocal
governments' legal capacity to... use local schools to inculcate a normative respect for nature").
56. Carlson, supranote 55, at 1286-91; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF
MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 74-75 (1999) (noting the decline of morality generally but observing
that "norms are more effective when people are under the observation of their peers and cannot
easily leave the peer group").
57. See Babcock, Assuming PersonalResponsibility, supra note 9, at 154 (describing the
norm of conformity); Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms, supra note 11, at 1118-19
(describing the reciprocity norm).
58. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility, supra note 9, at 164-65 (describing the
difficulties of using shame as a sanction but observing that it may be most effective in smaller,
close-knit communities).
59. Andrew Green, Norms, Institutions, and the Environment, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 105, 116
(2007) (citing DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 94 (1990)).

60. Indeed, the focus on norm activation to change behaviors arises in large part from the
recognition that traditional legal prohibitions may not be practically or politically feasible. See
Babcock, Global Climate Change, supra note 9, at 5-6 ("Efforts to detect and ultimately enforce
against environmentally harmful individual activities, many of which occur in and around the home,
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behaviors (turning lights off when leaving a room, for example),
government mandates and their enforcement may be practically
impossible. With respect to other behaviors, mandates and their
enforcement-even if feasible-may founder on objections that they are
uncomfortably intrusive. (Imagine, for example, being hailed by an
officer while unloading groceries in your driveway and receiving a
"carbon" ticket for using plastic shopping bags.) And mandates on
individual action that raise such objections create the risk of giving rise
to perverse responses. 6' In the context of the Endangered Species Act,
for example, objections to enforcement against individual (private)
property owners has resulted in an attitude of "shoot, shovel, and shut
up"-individuals going out of their way to exterminate endangered
species to avoid the Act's strictures.62 For the reasons that follow,
however, local governments may possess some advantages in the
difficult task of deploying mandates to achieve lifestyle and behavioral
changes.63
First, as described previously, local governments have invaluable,
community-level information to offer about what kind of mandates
(including their scope and any advisable exemptions) are likely to be
feasible and acceptable within a community. Once a mandate is adopted,
local governments also have community knowledge useful for
compliance and enforcement.64 Additionally, in part because of their
ability to craft and enforce mandates with an eye to local attitudes, local
would be costly for the government to carry out and would trigger enormous political resistance
because of the interference with individual liberty and invasion of privacy."); Vandenbergh, Taking
Individual Behavior Seriously, supra note 11,at 3 ("The intrusiveness and expense of enforcing
formal legal measures against millions of individuals make individual behavior difficult to regulate
through formal legal measures backed by sanctions.").
61. Babcock, Global Climate Change, supra note 9, at 5-6.
62. Andrew P. Morriss & Richard L. Stroup, Quartering Species: The "Living Constitution,'
the ThirdAmendment, and the Endangered Species Act, 30 ENVTL. L. 769, 795 (2000).
63. Of course, there are many other mechanisms (short of mandates applied directly to
individuals) that government might use to encourage (or indirectly mandate) compliance-imposing
as a product mandate a requirement that home lighting be motion sensitive (and turn off
automatically once one leaves a room) or encouraging the use of reusable canvas bags through
public information campaigns, for example. However, mandates, such as anti-idling laws, are one of
a number of policy tools (along with public information campaigns, removing impediments to
individual choice, creating financial incentives for desired action, and others) that might be used to
influence individual lifestyle and behaviors. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV, supra note 11,
at 599-600, 613-14 (describing the expressive function of command and control regulation as
applied to individual behavior); Vandenbergh et al., supra note 9, at 1727 (describing research
suggesting that public education campaigns "may function better in conjunction with laws that exact
penalties for excessive idling").
64. See Esty, Environmental Federalism, supra note 38, at 623; see also Flatt, supra note 48,
at 469-70 (discussing the influence local leaders have on compliance within the private sector).
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government efforts may be less likely to trigger intrusion objections than
more distant state or federal governments.
Imagine the difficulties, for example, posed to state and federal
authorities attempting to enforce an anti-idling law in many diverse
communities. Their capacity to enforce the law efficiently may founder
on a lack of local knowledge. They may be less likely to know, for
example, that the local Saturday night cruise is a hotbed of illegal idling,
or that parents picking up their kids from the local pool frequently idle
curbside with the air conditioning on during the summer months. And
state and federal authorities may not be aware of a community's sacred
cows-the behaviors that must either be exempted from the law or
overlooked with respect to enforcement (and instead pursued through
non-mandatory measures) to avoid inciting widespread community
backlash.6 5 Moreover, we are already conditioned to accept local
constraints on our everyday lives and behavior-fines for not sorting the
recycling, for parking in the wrong place, restrictions on times for lawn
watering, etc. One can imagine the potential public resistance, for
example, engendered by a national anti-idling law enforced by federal
agents. In short, local governments may have a better gestalt intuition
about how to structure and enforce mandates on individual behaviors
within their communities to best achieve compliance and avoid intrusion
objections.
Local governments are thus likely to possess local information
integral to prioritizing which lifestyle/behavior changes to seek in a
community and, once those are identified, how best to go about
achieving those changes. Because of their unique knowledge of local
attitudes, practices, infrastructure, and lifestyles, local governments may
be uniquely situated to identify both which GHG-reducing changes are
most likely to find acceptance in their communities (and impose the
lowest "costs" on individuals within the community) and also how best
to structure policies to achieve compliance.
IV. ANOTHER AREA OF SPECIAL LOCAL COMPETENCE: PHYSICAL
ARCHITECTURE

Local governments also define the physical architecture and
infrastructure of communities through building and zoning codes, a
function which greatly influences individual carbon emissions. It is well
65. Perhaps it is the cherished practice of idling vehicles to power electric grills during high
school football tailgates. In the long run, shutting down the high school tailgate in a flurry of fines
might not work as well as outfitting the parking lot with power outlets.
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recognized that this physical architecture and infrastructure-where and
how buildings, streets, parking lots, parks, etc. are constructed-in turn
defines the broad outlines of a community's energy needs and sets the
starting point for any conservation effort.6 6 And, for similar reasons,
physical architecture and infrastructure also channel the lifestyles and
behaviors of local individuals and constrain/define the range of choices
available to individuals to reduce their carbon footprint. Indeed, when
local control over building and zoning codes is identified as a
mechanism for local governments to reduce GHG emissions, a good
portion of those emissions reductions arise from changes in individual
lifestyle and behavior.67
Consider, for example, trips to the market. The physical
architecture and infrastructure of a community will both define the
"business as usual" carbon emissions of the average trip to the market as
well as the options available for reducing those emissions. The
emissions generated by a trip to the market in a suburban area are likely
to be indexed to the need to drive from a residential neighborhood to the
market and back. Similarly, options for reducing those emissions will be
largely dictated by physical architecture and infrastructure. There are
many potential ways to reduce the individual GHG emissions associated
with trips to the market. One might reduce the number of total trips (by
avoiding single-item driven trips-the Friday night pint of ice cream),
walk, take public transportation, drive but observe gas-saving driving
protocols (insuring tires are properly inflated, avoiding idling or quick
acceleration), drive a hybrid, carpool, etc. Individuals in traditional,
Euclidian-zoned (most suburban) communities may not have the option
of walking if markets are not located in areas readily accessible by foot
from residential neighborhoods; in many small communities, public
transportation may not exist.
Control over building and zoning codes thus presents another way
in which local governments can occasion reductions in individual GHG
emissions. And community knowledge may again be helpful to local
66. E.g., Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 9, at 827-28 (observing that state and local
governments "have greater political and practical abilities than the federal government to deal with
a substantial share of emissions, particularly those connected to individual behaviors" because
"[s]tate and local governments have authority over key infrastructure choices that mediate
behavioral decisions and the emission consequences of those decisions"); Healy, supra note 12, at
421-22; Patricia E. Salkin, Smart Growth and the Greening of Comprehensive Plans and Land Use
Regulations, in A.L.I. & A.B.A., COURSE OF STUDY: PLANNING, REGULATION, LITIGATION,
EMINENT DOMAIN, AND COMPENSATION 447-48 (2008); Trisolini & Zasloff, supra note 14, at 80-

82.
67.

Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 9, at 827.
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governments as they consider how best to structure building and zoning
code changes to achieve emissions reductions in ways compatible with
community needs and attitudes. While land use planning presents a very
powerful way for local governments to influence individual emissions, it
is not developed at length here for a few reasons. First, the link between
local land use planning and GHG emissions has already been extensively
examined and discussed.68 Similarly, the question of the relative
competence of federal versus state versus local governments with
respect to land use (and, in particular, smart growth land use) has
likewise already received significant treatment. 69 And, finally, mandates
contained in building and zoning codes are perhaps more akin 70 to
measures that indirectly give rise to changes in lifestyle and behavior.
V. RECOGNIZING LIMITS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAPABILITIES

This Idea has argued that local governments possess some
particular strengths with respect to influencing individual GHG-emitting
lifestyles and behaviors. There are, however, many components to
creating opportunities for individual choice and influencing individual
emissions-energy policy that supports renewable energy sources,
carbon footprint labeling for consumer goods-that are beyond the
competence of local governments. 71 Nor can local governments be relied
upon to unilaterally implement the kinds of behavior policies described
above.72 National and/or state action will likely be necessary both to
induce local governments to act to reduce individual emissions and to
provide funding and support for such efforts. Although, as noted above,
some local governments have acted to reduce emissions voluntarily,
external encouragement (federal funding or the threat of federal
enforcement, for example) will likely be needed for widespread local
involvement. And, especially in smaller communities, significant state or
federal assistance will likely be necessary to aid local governments.
For example, centralized expertise would likely be needed to assist
local governments in creating a GHG inventory indexed to the
individuals in their communities, calculating the emissions attributable
to and emissions reductions available from different behaviors, and
68. See supra note 63.
69. E.g., Patricia E. Salkin, Smart Growth and Sustainable Development: Threads of a
NationalLand Use Policy, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 381, 387 (2002).
70. See supra note 19.
71. See Peterson et al., supranote 45, at 252 (setting forth a Climate Policy Integration Matrix
matching economic sectors with the different levels of government).
72. See Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV, supra note 11, at 599.
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tracking forward-going emissions.7 3 This information could be used to
provide local governments with a menu of GHG-emitting behaviors of
their citizens from which they could select the behaviors best targeted in
their communities.74 Centralized expertise would also likely be
necessary to assist local governments in crafting effective public
information campaigns. 75 Although local governments have community
knowledge that will enable them to pick the message and means most
suited to their communities, they don't have the expertise to frame and
disseminate that message effectively. 76 The need for this assistance by
no means presents an insurmountable obstacle to local involvement-it
is typical of existing mechanisms of cooperative federalism and, already,
local governments have (without federal involvement) formed networks
that compile and disseminate information and strategies for achieving
local emissions reductions.77
Finally, further research and analysis is needed to more fully and
critically assess local government involvement in efforts to change
GHG-intensive lifestyles and behaviors. A better understanding of the
GHG emissions attributable to different individual behaviors and how
these behaviors compare between communities is necessary. It is
possible, for example, that the types of lifestyle and behavior changes
needed to yield meaningful volumes of GHG emissions reductions are
73. See id at 621 ("Economies of scale exist at the federal level to conduct, assess, and report
to the states and local governments on the general lessons of research on how to influence
environmentally significant behaviors. For some issues, state and localities may be better positioned
to tailor public information campaigus [sic] and other informational regulatory efforts to local
populations. For others, EPA may be better situated to play the role of providing information
directly to the public as well as to facilitate the activities of state and local governments."); see also
Esty, Environmental Federalism, supra note 38, at 614-15 (describing economies of scale in
developing technical information to support environmental regulation).
74. See Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 9, at 826 (describing the benefits of standardizing
state climate inventories).
75. See Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV, supra note 11, at 616-20 (describing the
complexities of, and social science expertise necessary for, successfully crafting environmental
public information campaigns); Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 7, at 1732 ("More
resource-intensive local information campaigns also may be necessary. These programs may need to
combine nationwide research with state and local implementation. Ensuring that these efforts rely
on the best available social-science research and are implemented rigorously will require a
fundamental reexamination of the way government funds research, staffs information offices,
designs and evaluates programs, and interacts with state and local governments.").
76. See, e.g., Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 7, at 1732.
77. For example, the United States Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Center
published Best Practices for municipalities seeking to reduce GHG emissions. See generally
MAYORS CLIMATE PROT. CTR., U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, TAKING LOCAL ACTION: MAYORS
AND
CLIMATE
PROTECTION
BEST
PRACTICES
(2009),
available
at

http://usmayors.org/pressreleases/uploads/ClimateBestPractices06l209.pdf (highlighting successful
programs implemented by a wide variety of municipalities, including large and small cities).
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more uniform between communities than assumed herein (thus
decreasing the importance of community information in the selection of
targeted behaviors). A more detailed review of social and personal norm
literature is necessary to evaluate the capabilities of localities to deploy
norms to influence behavior, including whether it is feasible to tailor
norm-activating information campaigns to local communities. And some
arguments that run counter to local involvement-that local
governments may be more sensitive to local opposition to measures
requiring individual sacrifice, for example 78-should also be carefully
weighed. Moreover, it is possible that public choice distortions or simple
corruption could be more severe at the local level. 79 Local politicians
might, for example, decline to target the emissions from favored groups
(the wealthy who fund campaigns, for example) and impose the greatest
burdens on those groups with the least political influence (poor
communities, immigrant communities, etc.), raising environmental
justice concerns.8 s
Ultimately, however, even in light of the limitations described
above and mindful of the identified uncertainties, there are some reasons
to believe that local government participation could prove immensely
useful to crafting and implementing policies for reducing individual
GHG emissions through lifestyle and behavior change. In contemplating
comprehensive efforts to reduce individual GHG emissions,
consideration should be given to the particular competence of local
governments and the community information that they command.

78. Stewart, supra note 13, at 1217-19 ("National mechanisms for determining environmental
policies facilitate, to a greater degree than their state and local counterparts, the achievement of
commitments entailing material sacrifice[.] ... [This is because] [u]nder centralized decisionmaking
these sacrifices may be less visible (because of fiscal mechanisms) or more palatable (because
widely shared). Or the sacrifices may be discounted because federal officials are simply less
sensitive to short-term swings in public attitudes.").
79. Esty, Environmental Federalism, supra note 38, at 649-51 (identifying limitations of
public participation in local environmental decisionmaking).
80. For example, an effort to circumscribe window air conditioner use while not addressing
the use of central air could disproportionately impact those in older and less expensive homes.
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